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Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism”. By 
Lisa Stampnitzky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2014. ISBN 978-1-10769734-8. Tables. Index, Sources cited. Pp. 
xii, 232. $44.99. 
 
Lisa Stampnitzky’s book Disciplining Terror won the 2012 Social Science 
History Association President’s Book Award.  It is both challenging and 
rewarding, but recommended primarily for the student interested in how 
terrorism came to be a topic of study used for political ends.  The book does 
not study terrorism per se, but rather examines how “experts” (real and self-
proclaimed) have viewed terrorism over the last fifty years and the various 
prisms through which terrorism has been viewed in the last fifty years.  For 
one seeking to learn about terrorism, its history, its ideologies, and 
personalities, this is not the book they seek.  
 
The author discusses the hijackings in the early 1960s that led to changes in 
aviation security.  That activity was from guerrillas, revolutionaries, and 
insurgents, but not terrorists according to the definitions of the day.  The U.S. 
viewed air piracy as a criminal act falling under the jurisdiction of law 
enforcement.  By the mid-1970s, hijacking came to include hostage taking and 
was viewed as terrorism.  Stampnitzky outlines how political violence became 
“terrorism” and how this process drove U.S. policy as defined by an ever-
evolving cadre of “experts.” 
 
The author posits many who analyze terrorism refuse to consider that 
terrorists are rational actors with reasons for carrying out their activities. In 
doing so, they miss an opportunity to examine terrorism to better understand 
the motivations behind their actions. She also indicates that terrorism is 
difficult to define as there are myriad definitions and points of view (e.g. one 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter). In such a quagmire of 
competing definitions, self-proclaimed “experts” can step in to define the 
issue in terms of rationality, morality, and politicization.  “Terrorism” 
emerged . . . as an inherently problematic concept – undefinable, infused with 
moral absolutism, and deeply politicized – leading to persistent difficulties for 
those who would create national knowledge about it. (9) 
 
The author states terrorism covers several disciplines, and rhetorically 
ponders if unbiased knowledge of the topic is possible as anyone can self-
proclaim as an “expert” with no objective standard against which to be 
judged. 
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“Yet terrorism experts have never consolidated control over the 
production of either experts or knowledge. New “self-
proclaimed” experts constantly emerge, no licensing body exists 
to certify “proper” expertise, and there is no agreement among 
terrorism experts about what constitutes useful knowledge. In 
sociological terms, the boundaries of the field are weak and 
permeable. There is little regulation of who may become an 
expert, and the key audience for terrorism expertise is not an 
ideal-typical scientific community of other terrorism experts 
but, rather, the public and the state. 
 
Rather than a purely political or analytical concept, expert 
discourse on “terrorism” must be understood as operating at 
the contested boundary between politics and science, between 
academic expertise and the state.” (12-13) 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism was viewed as a tactic and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) literature sought to examine motivations and 
grievances driving the actors.  Many who studied the terrorism mindset, 
mentality, and motives were maligned and “sympathetic” to the terrorists. 
With over 250 definitions, defining how to examine terrorism was 
problematic at best.  European COIN was a military discipline, whereas the 
U.S. had a more academic approach.  The 1972 Munich attacks, broadcast 
live, brought terrorism to the fore as a political weapon.  A mindset that 
terrorist acted irrationally and pathologically emerged, ignoring underlying 
reasons for their actions.  Brian Jenkins of RAND (a true expert) advocated 
that terrorism is a means to an end and its objectives must be understood in a 
larger political and social context. 
  
The Department of State looked at terrorism as a topic to be handled through 
diplomatic channels, replete with contingency plans, and qualitative analysis 
to place it within existing governmental frameworks.  RAND built databases 
of chronological events with specific criteria of what types of incidents to 
include or exclude (e.g. – an Irish Republican Army {IRA} attack against 
British forces in Northern Ireland was not terrorism, but an IRA attack in 
London was). 
 
A new chapter unfolded in the 1980s with the advent of Iranian-sponsored 
terror and the Reagan Administration.  President Reagan favored military 
retaliation (Libya, April 1986) vice diplomacy and framed anti-terror efforts 
as a civilizational struggle.  The 1979 Jerusalem Conference, Claire Sterling’s 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/11
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1516
 136 
 
book, The Terror Network, and a series of U.S. Senate hearings all pointed to 
the Soviet Union as a behind the scenes terror sponsor, thus transforming 
terrorism into an ideologically-driven political issue in the United States. 
 
The end of the Cold War transitioned to a focus on Islamic terror. The 
publications of Bernard Lewis’ article The Roots of Muslim Rage and Samuel 
Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilizations gave grist to a whole new cadre of self-
proclaimed “experts” who endlessly discussed and analyzed the ramifications 
of Lewis’ and Huntingdon’s ideas without having to defend or account for 
their hypotheses in an objective forum. 
 
A spate of attacks in the mid-1990s (World Trade Center in 1993, Tokyo 
subway and Oklahoma City in 1995, and Hamas against Israel throughout the 
decade) highlighted ideology and religion as motivations (described as both 
rational and irrational).  The Tokyo attack was carried out by a cult with a 
fanatical bent towards suicide, while the Oklahoma City attack was carried 
out by extreme right-wing lone wolves.  John Esposito’s book The Islamic 
Threat: Myth or Reality posited that Islam had replaced Communism as the 
new “threat” to keep the populace fixated on an exaggerated threat.  During 
this time, academics and pundits raged on all sides of the issue, while the true 
experts tried to keep pace with events as they occurred.  Terrorism was 
viewed in some academic circle as a subset of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), 
which hearkened back to COIN studies with its emphasis on small wars.  The 
advent of Usama bin Ladin (UBL) and the East Africa embassy bombings then 
placed focus on terrorism and its analysis as the act of non-rational actors 
driven by religion, fears of the new millennium, or nihilism.  In fact, we now 
know that UBL and his organization were rational actors with a means to an 
end action plan. 
 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attack, President Bush described 
terrorism in terms of an “evil” force to be fought in a struggle for civilization.  
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and pre-emptive invasion of Iraq due to 
fears of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were part of the Bush 
Administration’s so-called “One Percent Doctrine” (if there is even a one 
percent chance of a terror attack, that is too high a risk).  The Bush 
Administration had staff conduct analysis that did not agree with the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or other governmental 
entities.  To this day, the discrepancies have not been objectively resolved. 
 
“…first, the conceptualization of the terrorist as evil, irrational, and 
immune to both rational explanation, and second, the emergence of 
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terrorism as a problem that resists rational techniques of management 
and governance [have] led to the proposition that terrorists commit 
terrorism because they are terrorists. The identity contains its own 
explanation: “terrorists” are evil, irrational actors whose action is driven 
not by normal interests or political motives but, instead, by their very 
nature as terrorists. According to this framework, terrorists did not 
necessarily commit acts of violence for any rational political purpose (as 
they claimed) but, rather, because of their inherently evil nature” (179-
180). 
 
The current age has suffered from an “institutionalization” of terrorism 
expertise, which has led to what the author describes as “anti-knowledge,” 
which is opinionated screed, difficult to objectively analyze. 
 
“Part of the reason why the politics of anti-knowledge holds 
such power is the “undisciplined” nature of not just terrorism 
studies as a field but “terrorism” as an object of knowledge . . . 
terrorism studies did not take shape as an ideal-typical 
discipline or intellectual field, the terrorism field remains a 
relatively weak, “undisciplined” one, and “terrorism” itself 
remains an unstable, “undisciplined” object of knowledge… 
Terrorism experts have failed to gain control over either the 
boundaries of the field or the production and certification of 
experts. There is little regulation of who may become an 
expert.” (194-195) 
 
The book outlines the intrinsic difficulties faced by the legitimate terrorism 
experts faced with self-proclaimed savants.  As terrorism will be an existential 
concern for many years, how it is examined and analyzed will be at the fore of 
national security topics with no end in sight. 
 
Mark Roberts 
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